Introduction
Classification according to the routing mechanism Classification according to the routing mechanism A novel on-demand, multipath routing protocol, secure against a bounded number of colluding malicious nodes, the SecMR discovers the complete set of the existing non-cyclic, node-disjoint paths between a source and a target node, for a given maximum hop distance. The size of the identifier ID i depends on the average network connectivity and is a relatively small number.
In periodic time intervals, each node n i broadcasts to its one-hop neighbors a signed message including the current time and its unique identifier that is included in its certificate.
The duration of the time period of the neighborhood authentication phase is a system parameter and depends on the volatility of the environment. 
Selection of random: K S,T = The secret key (security association) to be shared between S and T

Computation of: E PK(T) (K S,T ) and hash K(S,T) (ID S, ID T, seq, hop max )
4. Broadcast of query: Then, it waits for a certain amount of time in order to receive any other threads of the same route request query coming from different paths.
The keyed hash-value of each thread is also checked.
Then, the target node T constructs the maximum set of node-disjoint paths M.
For each RouteList j Є M, node T constructs and broadcasts a route reply message as: 
Route Error
If a node n i realizes during neighbourhood authentication at time t+1 that an established link with a neighbouring node n j during time t is now broken, then node n i broadcasts a route error message for any active route coming through n i , that is affected due to the destruction of the link (ni, nj).
The route error message is digitally signed by the node n i .
If the error messages are not signed, malicious nodes might flood the network with fake error messages even for routes that they do not participate in, and in this way disable communication. The route error message is of the form:
Ε S,T =[ ID S , ID T, seq, ID i, RouteList, sig i (ID S, ID T, seq, ID i, RouteList) ]
End to end route authentication End to end route authentication
The route request is end-to-end authenticated with the security association K S,T that is exchanged. The keyed hash-value hash KS,T (ID S ,ID T ,seq,hop max ) included in the initial query allows the target node to authenticate the request query.
Link Link--to to--link route authentication link route authentication
The links of a routing path are also authenticated indirectly, d
The links of a routing path are also authenticated indirectly, due to the ue to the neighborhood neighborhood authentication phase of the protocol. authentication phase of the protocol.
End to end route integrity End to end route integrity
Each route reply message includes a keyed hash-value hash KS,T (ID S ,ID T ,seq,RouteList j ). Thus, if the routing path p j =(ID S ,RouteList j ,ID T ) has been altered, then the verification of the keyed hash-value will fail at node S and the fake path will not be used.
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Analysis (2/3)
Protection against malicious collaborating nodes
By using k node-disjoint paths of communication, an adversary should compromise at least k nodes -and more particularly at least one node in each route -in order to control the communication.
According to the operation mode, SecMR offers different levels of protection.
In parallel mode, the protocol is resilient against k -1 collaborating malicious nodes.
In single operation mode the adversary can disrupt communication by compromising only the active path. The time required to activate an alternative path is still much less than in single-path routing protocols, but there are cases where such disruption may be critical.
Complete as intermediate nodes processes all the incoming requests.
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Node-disjoint with the use of RouteList.
Non-Cyclic with the use of the ExcludeList which forces the which forces the query to move only to more distant nodes of query to move only to more distant nodes of S S towards towards T. T.
Message length of the used lists:
Message length of the used lists: SRP uses only symmetric cryptography in an end SRP uses only symmetric cryptography in an end--to to--end manner, to protect end manner, to protect the integrity of the route discovery. the integrity of the route discovery. 
Conclusions
In networks that require high security protection and present medium mobility as well as a rather high node density SecMR protocol has comparable efficiency with the SRP, while it offers an increased security level.
This is expected as Multipath[4] floods the network with route requests messages, while SecMR performs selective forward with the use of the ExcludList.
SRP [19] manages to perform well in networks with increased node density as it avoids discovering all the possible routes that each node could participate and in this way it converges faster, but this makes it vulnerable to distributed DoS attacks.
SeCMR combines the strong security advantageous of Multipath with a performance comparable to SRP.
